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Abstract 
A criminal conviction resulting from a guilty plea rather than a full trial is typically 
justified on the basis that the defendant had the ability to go to trial, but instead chose to 
admit guilt in exchange for a small sentence reduction. In other words, the conviction, 
and associated waiver of rights, occurred by consent. In this article, I challenge that 
notion by drawing on psycho-legal research on vulnerability and consent and research 
on guilty pleas in the United States. I suggest that whilst plea procedure in England and 
Wales has largely escaped criticism due to modest sentence reductions compared to the 
United States ‘plea bargaining’ system, aspects of the system are highly problematic and 
are likely to be leading to non-consensual guilty pleas, in which innocent defendants are 
pleading guilty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Whilst extensive research has examined the problem of wrongful conviction in the United States 
‘plea bargaining’ system, guilty pleas in England and Wales have not received the same 
consideration. This is despite research dating back to the 1970s showing that ‘false’ guilty pleas 
(guilty pleas from defendants who are factually innocent) are likely to be occurring.1 More 
recently, where guilty pleas and associated sentence reductions have been considered, they have 
largely escaped criticism, with researchers concluding sentence reductions are modest and 
reasonable.2 Thus even though it is known that innocent defendants are likely to be pleading 
guilty, the choice to do so is still seen as largely rational, autonomous, and consensual.3 
However, psycho-legal research and a more thorough examination of the literature on the United 
States system suggest that this conclusion is at least partially incorrect. It overlooks the context 
in which guilty pleas are being made, in which vulnerable defendants can face incentives to 
plead (in addition to relatively minor sentence length reductions) that call into question the 
voluntariness of plea decisions and undermine their consensual nature. This means some 
defendants are left with no practical choice but to plead guilty, and undermines the status of 
conviction by guilty plea as consensual.  
                                                     
1 J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty (Martin 
Robertson, 1977); J. Baldwin and M. McConville, ‘Plea bargaining and plea negotiation in 
England’ (1978) 13 Law & Society Rev. 287; A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal 
Process, 4th edition (Oxford University Press, 2010) 310-20. 
2 See N. Vamos, ‘Please don’t call it ‘plea bargaining’’ (2009) 9 Criminal Law Rev. 617; J. V. 
Roberts and B. Bradford, ‘Sentence reductions for a guilty plea in England and Wales’ (2015) 
12(2) J. Empirical Legal Studies 187. 
3 Ibid. 
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Convictions that occur as the result of plea and not trial have been referred to as ‘convictions by 
consent.’4 This is because the defendant being found guilty without the protections of a full 
criminal trial is justified by the fact that this was the result of the defendant’s own choice – they 
could have contested their guilt at trial but chose instead to admit guilt. The soundness of 
convictions that occur in this way is dependent on the reasons why the defendant decided to 
plead guilty. Traditionally, plea decisions have been seen as the defendant being able to freely 
admit to something that (s)he has done, save the system time and money, and receive a reduced 
sentence in recognition of this.5 However, increasingly research suggests that in the right 
conditions plea decisions are not always or even typically consensual admissions of guilt, but are 
rather tactical decisions based on forecasting the probability of conviction at trial and the likely 
outcomes of trial, and evaluating potential discounts in exchange for pleading guilty.6 This is 
particularly true since defendants can often be fairly sure of the sentencing outcome should they 
plead guilty, through a Goodyear hearing in which a defendant can ask a judge for an advance 
indication of sentence based on a plea of guilty. 7 
 
As plea decisions are recognized as tactical decisions rather than just admissions of guilt, 
research into how these decisions are made and whether they are truly autonomous and 
consensual is, it is suggested, vital to the integrity of a criminal justice system.8 Rather than 
                                                     
4 J. Baldwin and M. McConville, ‘Conviction by consent: A study of plea bargaining and 
inducements to plead guilty in England’ (1978) 7(3) Anglo-Am. Law Rev. 271.  
5 See S. C. Thaman, ‘Plea-bargaining, negotiating confessions and consensual resolution of 
criminal cases’ (2007) 11(3) Electronic J. Comparative Law, 
<https://www.ejcl.org/113/article113-34.pdf>  
6 S. Bibas, ‘Plea bargaining outside the shadow of trial’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Rev. 2464 
7 R v Goodyear [2005] 3 All ER 117. 
8 A defendant who enters a plea non-voluntarily or non-consensually cannot be said to have had 
a fair trial, and as stated by Lord Steyn in Brown, ‘if the defendant had not received the 
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relying on such research, plea systems typically presume that defendants are rational and 
autonomous agents despite increasing recognition that this is not the reality.9 In fact, many 
defendants are likely to be vulnerable, subject to external pressures, and in need of protection 
from the justice system. In the context of guilty pleas, defendants require protection from 
coercive deals and external pressures that may lead them to plead guilty for the wrong reasons, 
particularly when innocent. However, such protection has not been provided despite empirical 
research demonstrating external pressures faced by defendants.10 In fact, rather than providing 
protections for defendants, criminal justice systems, including the system in England and Wales, 
are increasingly adding to pressures that may lead defendants to plead guilty – for example by 
allowing a guilty plea to make the difference between a community and custodial sentence, or 
allowing a guilty plea to result in immediate release from custody where contesting guilt would 
result in a longer period on remand. These incentives are based on the premise that even where 
pressures are placed on the defendant, their decision to plead guilty is still consensual.  
 
In this article, I highlight vulnerabilities of defendants when considering whether to plead guilty 
in England and Wales and explore how these vulnerabilities can interact with current procedure 
to undermine the autonomy and consent of defendants facing plea decisions, and ultimately to 
lead innocent defendants to plead guilty. I begin by examining the notion of vulnerability as a 
foundation for evaluating infrastructure in the criminal justice system, and draw on research from 
                                                                                                                                                                           
substance of a fair trial, the administration of justice had entirely failed.’ R v. Brown [2003] 1 
AC 681 at 708. 
9 In fact, this is part of a wider phenomenon in the criminal justice system where defendant rights 
are being balanced against community interests, expediency, and other utilitarian-based 
concerns, see L. Hoyano, ‘What is balanced on the scales of justice? In search of the essence of 
the right to a fair trial.’ (2014) 1 Criminal Law Rev. 4. 
10 See J. Baldwin and M. McConville, above n. 1.  
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psychology to analyze vulnerability’s connection to psycho-legal concepts of consent, autonomy, 
and voluntariness. I then relate these concepts to the regulations surrounding guilty pleas, 
highlighting the delicate relationship between guilty pleas, the presumption of innocence, and 
access to justice. I then briefly explore the United States ‘plea bargaining’ system to illustrate 
how plea procedure can undermine defendant choice and lead to innocent defendants pleading 
guilty.  This context is used to analyze the current plea system in England and Wales.  
 
I consider situations in which the autonomy of defendants may be undermined when making plea 
decisions, meaning that decisions to plead guilty may not truly be voluntary or consensual. First, 
defendants may feel forced to plead guilty where this provides an immediate way to get out of 
custody, they have an urgent need to get out of custody, and they will remain remanded in 
custody if they want to exercise their right to a full trial. Second, defendants may feel forced to 
plead guilty where a guilty plea will likely make the difference between a custodial sentence and 
a community sentence and they cannot afford economically or socially to risk a custodial 
sentence. Finally, defendants, particularly those who cannot afford to take time away from work 
or child-care, may feel forced to plead guilty since this is likely to provide a significantly quicker 
and cheaper resolution than contesting guilt at trial.11 Whilst mindful of the utilitarian benefits 
that are gained through processing criminal cases efficiently, quickly, and without the need for a 
full trial, I argue that legal infrastructure needs to recognize the vulnerability of potential 
defendants and provide additional protection to ensure guilty pleas are being entered for the right 
reasons. I suggest that changes are needed in the current system. Specifically, we need to move 
                                                     
11 Note that commentaries have also suggested other reasons that innocent defendants may feel 
pressured to plead guilty. For example, implicit pressure from some defence council who may be 
influenced by the belief that most clients are guilty, see J. Baldwin and M. McConville, above n. 
1.  
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away from a system that presumes defendants are able to exercise autonomy and towards a 
system which asks, how can we facilitate consensual, voluntary, choices for defendants accused 
of a criminal offence and thus ensure true access to justice. 
 
THE VULNERABLE DEFENDANT 
 
1. Vulnerability in the Criminal Justice Context 
Vulnerability theory has recently been gaining traction in legal research. The theory challenges 
traditional conceptions of citizens as autonomous and independent and instead understands 
human beings as being vulnerable and embedded in social relationships and institutions.12 This is 
in contrast with equal protection models, whereby the obligation of the state is to treat everyone 
the same way.13 According to vulnerability theory, as citizens we are reliant on institutions which 
can exploit or mitigate human vulnerability and in this context, the role of the state is to monitor 
and reorient institutions that are not functioning in a fair way.14 This is particularly true in the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales (similarly to many other criminal justice systems), 
for two reasons. First, the state has the power to restrict liberty upon conviction of certain 
offences at criminal trial or (in some cases) while awaiting criminal trial. This marks a powerful 
(and legally permitted) intrusion into the fundamental right to liberty granted by Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.15  This gives the state great power over and places the 
                                                     
12 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The vulnerable subject: Anchoring equality in the human 
condition’ (2008) 20(1) Yale J. of Law & Feminism, 1.  
13 Ibid at 9.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Human Rights Act 1998 (Sch. 1). 
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individual in a vulnerable position.16 The second reason that defendants are particularly 
vulnerable in the criminal justice system is the demographics of the typical ‘defendant,’ which 
overlap in many ways with the demographics of the most vulnerable groups in British society.17 
For example, an analysis conducted as part of a Home Office White Paper examined persistent 
offenders in the criminal justice system and suggested that the 100,000 people found to be the 
‘most persistent offenders’ share a common profile – nearly two thirds are hard drug users, more 
than a third were in care as children, half have no qualifications at all, nearly half have been 
excluded from school and three-quarters have no work and little to no legal income.18 Similarly, 
forty five percent of male offenders in prisons were found to have no qualifications (compared 
with less than ten percent of the general population aged between twenty and thirty).19 This is 
representative of a wider link between social class and crime, whereby those of lower socio-
economic class are more likely to be arrested, convicted, and incarcerated for crimes.20  
 
Currently, our justice system is not based on the idea of vulnerable citizens, but on the idea of 
citizens as autonomous actors who are able to exercise their autonomy, assess relevant options, 
                                                     
16 This is particularly true since research suggests that custody officers and police officers may 
actively try to find sufficient grounds for detention, depriving people of their liberty before any 
criminal conviction. See R. Dehaghani, ‘Automatic authorization: An exploration of the decision 
to detain in police custody’ (2017) 3 Criminal Law Rev. 187.  
17 Note that the situation may be different in the relatively small number of prosecutions 
involving wealthy businesses or business owners who may have access to more resources than 
the Crown Prosecution Service.  
18 Ministry of Justice, Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead (White Paper, Cm 5074, 2001) Annex 
B.  
19 Ibid, Ch. 2. 
20 Bryan Lee Miller, ‘Social class and crime’ (2015) The Encyclopedia of Crime and 
Punishment.  
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and make consensual choices.21 This is particularly true when considering guilty pleas. In this 
context, we presume that individual defendants are autonomous actors capable of making a free 
and informed decision. However, this is not the reality for many defendants, who are vulnerable 
due to actual or potential restrictions on their freedom and influenced by social and economic 
pressures. In this context, defendants must decide whether to plead guilty or go to trial. These 
defendants are in a hugely vulnerable position, and reliant on the criminal justice system to 
provide necessary protections to ensure that the presumption of innocence is sufficiently 
respected in practice.  
 
2. Vulnerability, Voluntariness, and Conviction by Plea 
The fact that individuals accused of crimes are vulnerable has implications for their consent and 
autonomy. This is particularly important in the guilty plea context, in which the system relies 
almost entirely on defendants making voluntary and informed decisions as consenting agents. In 
fact, the system specifically requires guilty pleas to be unequivocal,22 voluntary,23 and personal 
to the defendant.24 Typically it has been assumed that ensuring legal representation for 
defendants will protect them from feeling coerced into making non-consensual decisions and 
ensure access to justice.25 However, even where defendants do have legal representation, if there 
                                                     
21 For example, see R v Turner [1970] 2 QB 321, where the Court of Appeal found that defence 
lawyer having told the defendant that he had free choice and emphasizing that he must not plead 
guilty unless guilty was sufficient to ensure free and accurate plea decisions.  
22 Durham Quarter Sessions, ex parte Virgo [1952] 2 QB 1. 
23 See R v Turner, above n. 21.  
24 R v Williams [1978] QB 373. 
25 See R v Turner, above n. 21. In this case, the appellant contended that his guilty plea resulted 
from his barrister suggesting that this would make the difference between a custodial and non-
custodial sentence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the guilty plea as the defendant’s choice and 
emphasized the role of the defence lawyer as the protector of the defendant, stating that the 
defence lawyer should advise the defendant not to plead guilty if they are not guilty.  
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are cases in which a guilty plea may be the only practical choice for a defendant given their 
vulnerabilities, as will be suggested below, the defendant will be making the only choice really 
open to them, and the cautions of a lawyer cannot help.26 In addition, research has suggested that 
lawyers can sometimes be part of the problem through pressuring defendants to enter pleas.27 
Therefore, it is important to consider whether defendants are really making consensual decisions, 
even where they are represented by a lawyer.  
 
From a psychological perspective, consent is typically thought of as a combination of 
understanding and freedom from coercion.28 If an individual is coerced into doing something that 
would ordinarily signify consent (for example entering a guilty plea in court), then (s)he does not 
act voluntarily and what (s)he does, does not constitute consent.29 In other words, although a 
person gives his assent, this does not amount to consent unless the assent is given voluntarily 
(that is, absent coercion). Although coercion is most often thought of as being through physical 
threats, social, moral, and economic pressures may also be coercive in this way where they 
undermine the ability of a person to make a voluntary decision. Circumstances can also subvert 
the voluntary nature of a decision, particularly for those who are vulnerable and therefore lack 
choice in a meaningful way. Here, vulnerability takes away the practical choice of the actor. For 
example, imagine that a group of prisoners and a group of non-incarcerated adults are both 
                                                     
26 For a discussion of this dilemma for defence lawyers in the context of the United States plea 
system, see R. K. Helm, V. F. Reyna, A. A. Franz, R. Z. Novick, S. Dincin and A. E. Cort, 
‘Limitations on the Ability to Negotiate Justice: Attorney Perspectives on Guilt, Innocence, and 
Legal Advice in the Current Plea System’ (in press), Psychology, Crime, & Law. 
27 See, for example, J. Baldwin and M. McConville, above n. 1 at 62. 
28 B. H. Bix, ‘Contracts’, in The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice, eds. Miller and 
Werthheimer (2009), Ch. 10, 251.  
29 J. Kleinig, ‘The Nature of Consent’ in The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice, eds. Miller 
and Werthheimer (2009), Ch. 1, 14. 
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making a decision about whether to enroll in a potentially dangerous clinical trial in exchange for 
compensation. Prisoners are unlikely to be able to access this compensation in other ways, 
whereas the non-incarcerated adults are likely to be able to. This means the compensation may 
be coercive for prisoners but not for the non-incarcerated adults. The vulnerability of the 
prisoners in terms of their lack of access to funds in alternative ways may make compensation 
coercive to them and thus subvert the voluntariness of their agreement to participate in the trials. 
For this reason, there are more stringent ethical rules on prisoner consent to participation in 
research to recognize their heightened vulnerability, and potential lack of meaningful consent.30  
 
The notion of vulnerability undermining consent has been given consideration in other areas of 
the criminal law. For example, current law dictates that where actual bodily harm or greater to a 
victim is intended, the consent of the ‘victim’ is no longer a defence to criminal liability (subject 
to exceptions).31 One rationale for this is based on the vulnerability of the victim and / or the 
exploitative nature of underlying circumstances that may undermine the autonomy or freedom of 
choice of the victim.32 So, where a woman gives ‘consent’ to be hurt by a partner who has a 
history of exercising coercive control over her, her ‘consent’ must be understood in this 
context.33 In the context of guilty pleas, the state typically has control over the defendant’s 
freedom and liberty, and consent must be understood in this context. If the defendant has been 
                                                     
30 See, for example, Office for Human Research Protections, ‘Prisoner Involvement in Research’ 
(2003) <https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/prisoner-research-ohrp-
guidance-2003/index.html>; Office for Human Research Protections ‘The Belmont Report’ 
(1979) <https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/read-the-belmont-
report/index.html> 
31 Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 HL at 234, per Lord Templeman. 
32 J. Tolmie, ‘Consent to harmful assaults: The case for moving away from category based 
decision making.’ (2012). 9 Criminal Law Rev. 656, at 660. 
33 Ibid.  
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placed in a position in which they have no practical choice but to plead guilty, the guilty plea 
entered and the associated waiver of the right to trial cannot be said to be consensual. 
 
In fact, the House of Lords seems to have at least implicitly recognized that incentives to plead 
guilty could be considered to undermine consent.34 Specifically, in the context of an extradition 
case where a plea deal from the United States was considered, the House of Lords rejected the 
contention that the plea deal, resulting in a three to four year sentence as a result of a guilty plea 
compared to an eight to ten year sentence if convicted at trial, amounted to impermissible 
pressure to surrender legal rights. However, Lord Brown, delivering the judgment of the House 
of Lords, implied that a significant enough discrepancy between plea and trial could amount to 
unlawful pressure.35 This suggests that courts in England and Wales would be reluctant to allow 
some of the more significant reductions in sentence in exchange for a guilty plea seen in the 
United States.36   In the next section of this article I will argue that despite differences between 
the plea systems in England and Wales in the United States, there are commonalities underlying 
the two systems. Importantly, in both systems there are incentives to plead guilty that create a 
discrepancy between plea and trial that are likely to undermine the consent of defendants.  
 
 
 
                                                     
34 McKinnon v United States [2008] UKHL 59; [2008] 1 WLR 1739.  
35 Lord Brown, delivering the judgment of the court stated: ‘In one sense all discounts for pleas 
of guilty could be said to subject the defendant to pressure, and the greater the discount the 
greater the pressure. But the discount would have to be very substantially more generous than 
anything promised here (as to the way the case would be put and the likely outcome) before it 
constituted unlawful pressure such as to vitiate the process (of extradition).’ McKinnon v United 
States, above n. 34, at para. 38.  
36 See N. Vamos, above n. 2.  
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‘PLEA BARGAINING’ IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
In the United States, guilty pleas account for over 97 per cent of criminal convictions at a federal 
level.37 Guilty pleas are typically entered into as a result of a practice known as ‘plea 
bargaining.’ This is a process where a person accused of a crime pleads guilty to a lesser crime in 
order to receive a lesser punishment.38 When a defendant is accused of a crime, the prosecutor 
will typically make a plea offer to the defence lawyer who will then convey this offer to the 
defendant who must decide whether to accept the offer, or try to prove their innocence at trial.39 
Such offers are often coercive, partly because there are sometimes large discrepancies between 
the outcome of pleading guilty and the possible outcome at trial.40 This practice is relatively free 
from regulation or judicial intervention, and while judges can reject plea deals or alter sentences 
agreed upon by the parties this rarely happens in practice.41  
 
Empirical research provides strong evidence to suggest that this system operates in a coercive 
way that encourages innocent as well as guilty defendants to plead guilty,42 and in fact this is 
even acknowledged by the system in many states by the so called ‘Alford’ plea, where a 
                                                     
37 United States Sentencing Commission, 2015 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, 
Figure C (2015) <https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/FigureC.pdf>  
38 R. K. Helm and V. F. Reyna, ‘Logical but incompetent plea decisions: A new approach to plea 
bargaining grounded in cognitive theory,’ (2017) 23(3) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 367. 
39 See H. M. Caldwell, ‘Coercive plea bargaining: The unrecognized scourge of the justice 
system.’ (2011). 61 Catholic University Law Rev. 63.  
40 Ibid.  
41 J. H. Blume and R. K. Helm, ‘The unexonerated’ (2014) 100 Cornell Law Rev. 157 
42 Ibid; H. M. Caldwell, above n. 39; T. M. Zottoli, T. Daftary-Kapur, G. M. Winters, and C. 
Hogan, ‘Plea discounts, time pressures, and false-guilty pleas in youth and adults who pleaded 
guilty to felonies in New York City’ (2016) 22(3) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 250; L. E. 
Dervan and V. A. Edkins, ‘The innocent defendant’s dilemma: An innovative empirical study of 
plea bargaining’s innocence problem’ (2013) 103(1) J. of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1. 
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defendant can plead guilty while maintaining innocence.43 The fact that innocent defendants are 
feeling coerced into pleading guilty is partly because of excessive sentence and charge discounts. 
For example, one study reported anecdotal evidence of a defendant charged with a felony 
(serious offence) where loss of life was involved who was offered the opportunity to plead guilty 
to a misdemeanor (a minor offence) and be released from jail, and of a defendant charged with 
sexual assaults and threatened with a 40-year sentence at trial but offered the opportunity to 
plead guilty to disorderly conduct and be sentenced only to pay court costs.44 However, this may 
not be the only, or even predominant reason why innocent defendants are pleading guilty in the 
United States. Research has also suggested that innocent defendants feel coerced into pleading 
guilty when pleading guilty can allow them to get out of the justice system faster, and 
specifically when it can allow them to get out of jail where going to trial would involve further 
remand in custody.45 This problem can be illustrated by the case of Erma Faye Stewart. Erma 
Faye Stewart was an African-American mother of two who was arrested as part of a drug sweep 
prompted by a confidential informant and remanded in custody. She claimed that she was 
innocent, but became increasingly panicked as while she was in jail there was no one to care for 
her two young children. As a result, she agreed to plead guilty to delivery of a controlled 
substance in order to get out of jail and back to her family, and was sentenced to ten years of 
probation. During the trial of others arrested as part of the drugs sweep, it was discovered that 
the informant had lied and all cases were dismissed – however this did not help Erma since she 
                                                     
43 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); for more information see J. H. Blume and R. K. 
Helm, above n. 38, at 171-172.  
44 R. K. Helm, V. F. Reyna, A. A. Franz, R. Z. Novick, S. Dincin and A. E. Cort, above n. 26. 
45 A. Natapoff, ‘Misdemeanors’ (2012) 85 Southern California Law Rev. 1313 at 1346 - 1347; J. 
H. Blume and R. K. Helm, above n. 38.  
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had already pleaded guilty.46 This type of situation, and not huge sentence and charge discounts, 
is the root of many wrongful convictions in the United States.47 So, the system in the United 
States is more complex than just being about large sentence and charge discounts. This means 
that we cannot assume the system in England and Wales does not operate in a coercive way just 
because these sentence and charge discounts are not present. In fact, insight into how the need to 
avoid or get out of jail can pressure defendants can highlight problems that are likely to be 
present in England and Wales.  
 
GUILTY PLEAS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
England and Wales differs in important respects from the United States system, but although the 
proportion of cases resolved by plea is lower than in the United States, it is still high. In 2016-
2017, 76.9 per cent of defendants (78.1 per cent of defendants in the magistrates’ court, and 70.1 
per cent of defendants in the Crown Court) in England and Wales pleaded guilty rather than 
opting to go to trial.48  Procedure in England and Wales does differ from that in the United States 
in important respects. Most importantly, sentencing power is primarily with the Judge (or 
magistrate) and not the prosecutor (although prosecutors are able to allow defendants to plead 
guilty to a lesser charge than the one they are accused of, subject to compliance with ethical 
guidelines). 49  When a Judge is sentencing a defendant, they will take into account whether the 
defendant pleaded guilty and if so when, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and sentencing 
                                                     
46 Ibid at 174-175.  
47 A. Natapoff, ‘Misdemeanors’ (2012) 85 Southern California Law Rev. 1313 at 1346 - 1347. 
48 Crown Prosecution Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2016-2017, 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/annual_report_2016_17.pdf> 
49 Ibid at 626. 
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guidelines written by the Sentencing Council.50  Under the current guidelines, a sentence 
reduction of one-third should be made (subject to exceptions) where the defendant enters a guilty 
plea at the first stage of proceedings. This reduction is then reduced the further along 
proceedings progress prior to the plea being entered, to a maximum of a one-tenth reduction on 
the first day of trial. This reduction can result in imposing a different ‘type’ of sentence than 
would be received if convicted at trial, for example by reducing a custodial sentence to a 
community sentence, or by reducing a community sentence to a fine. These reductions appear 
modest compared to those offered in the United States. 
 
However, an understanding of the vulnerable position in which defendants in the criminal justice 
system are in, coupled with insight into reasons that innocent defendants feel coerced into 
pleading guilty in the United States, reveals incentives to plead that may be operating coercively 
even in the absence of large charge and sentence length discounts – getting out of custody, 
avoiding custody, and getting out of the criminal justice system more quickly and easily. 
Importantly, these incentives can lead to defendants pleading guilty when it is not likely that they 
would be convicted at trial.  
 
1. Getting out of custody 
As in the United States, some defendants in England and Wales can get out of jail by pleading 
guilty when otherwise they would have to remain in custody. This is so despite the fact that a 
defendant should not be remanded in custody where ‘there is no real prospect that the person will 
                                                     
50 Sentencing Council, ‘Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea Definitive Guideline’ (2017), 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction-in-Sentence-for-Guilty-
plea-Definitive-Guide_FINAL_WEB.pdf> 
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be sentenced to a custodial sentence in the proceedings.’51  This is because, as discussed below, a 
defendant with a prospect of a custodial sentence if convicted at trial may be unlikely to receive 
a custodial sentence when pleading guilty. In addition, even defendants who would have 
qualified for a custodial sentence but have been held on remand may be able to get out of 
custody immediately by pleading guilty through arguing that the time they have spent on remand 
in prison is enough.  This is particularly important where a defendant knows that they are highly 
unlikely to receive a custodial sentence if they plead guilty, due to indications given as the result 
of a Goodyear hearing (where an indication of the likely maximum sentence should the 
defendant plead guilty is given).  
 
The potential for defendants to be coerced into pleading guilty to get out of jail immediately, or 
at least more quickly, is exacerbated by long waiting times to contest guilt at trial and relatively 
short waiting times to enter a guilty plea. In 2009, 53,400 defendants proceeded against at the 
Magistrates Court (three percent of the total number of defendants) and 39,848 percent of 
defendants tried at the Crown Court (thirty-four percent of the total number of defendants) were 
remanded to custody awaiting trial.52  In 2016, the average waiting time for defendants 
committed for trial to the Crown Court was significantly longer for those who pleaded not guilty 
than those who pleaded guilty (32.3 weeks compared to 15.1 weeks).53  This is further 
                                                     
51 Sch. 1 of the Bail Act 1976, as amended by Sch.11 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing, and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  
52 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Statistics England and Wales 2009’ (2009), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217947/criminal
-statistics-annual.pdf>  
53Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal court statistics quarterly, England and Wales, January to March 
2017’ (2017), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/623096/ccsq-
bulletin-jan-mar-2017.pdf> 
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exacerbated by the fact that conditions in remand prisons are often severe, which can add to the 
stress and frustration of defendants awaiting trial and sentence.54 When faced with the 
opportunity to get out of jail to care for dependents, resume employment or education, and repair 
damage to relationships and reputation even innocent defendants may feel coerced into pleading 
guilty. This can be very important for any defendant, but particularly so for defendants who 
cannot afford to remain in custody. As discussed above, this fact that the opportunity to get out 
of custody may be coercive even for innocent defendants has already been illustrated in the 
context of the United States system.  
 
2. Avoiding Custody 
Relatedly, if defendants may feel coercion to plead guilty to get out of jail when on remand, it is 
likely that they may also feel coercion to plead guilty where this provides a sure opportunity to 
avoid custody all together.  Although sentence length reductions in England and Wales seem 
modest, sentence reductions may be problematic due to the potential for pleading guilty to result 
in imposing a different ‘type’ of sentence than that which would be received if convicted at trial. 
This means that a defendant who would be likely to receive a custodial sentence if convicted at 
trial could receive a non-custodial sentence by pleading guilty, at least in cases where a non-
custodial sentence is permitted by sentencing guidelines.55  
                                                     
54 See HM Inspectorate of Prisons, ‘Remand prisoners: A thematic review’ (2012),  
<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2012/08/remand-thematic.pdf>, noting that 29 per cent of remand 
prisoners said they had spent less than two hours out of their cells each day, only 42 per cent had 
spent more than four hours out of their cell, and only 41 per cent of remand prisoners said they 
had access to outside exercise three or more times a week.  
55 This issue was raised in relatively early plea jurisprudence in the case of R v Turner, above n. 
21. In this case Turner claimed that his guilty plea was entered purely because he was led to 
believe that it would make the difference between a custodial and non-custodial sentence. The 
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The opportunity to be certain of avoiding custody is likely to be both practically and 
psychologically persuasive to defendants.  For some defendants, the potential downsides of 
threatened custody may be so severe that they cannot risk going to trial, and are left with no 
practical choice but to plead guilty. These include defendants in similar situations to Erma Faye 
Stewart, who are single parents. Defendants may also have insecure employment that could be 
lost due to any time in custody, or they may have an insecure financial or housing situation and 
may be unsure how they would cope were they to receive a custodial sentence. Even where 
innocent, these defendants are not able to risk losing their jobs, homes, financial-security, or 
even child custody by exercising their right to trial, when a guilty plea can safeguard these, at 
least in the short-term. Having a certain (or almost certain) way to avoid custody through the 
guilty plea and a possible custodial sentence at trial means that these defendants are left with no 
practical choice but to plead guilty. 
 
Psycho-legal research also suggests that offering a sentence-type if a plea is entered that is 
different from the sentence-type if convicted at trial, is likely to be psychologically persuasive 
and could even operate in a coercive way, altering the way defendants perceive their options and 
their ability to maintain their innocence. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that at least 
in adults, decision-making is driven by categorical, meaning-based differences rather than more 
superficial and fine-grained distinctions.56 This means that where plea decisions involve 
                                                                                                                                                                           
judgment of the Court of Appeal, supporting the guilty plea in the case, stated that the guilty plea 
should be a statement of remorse and was a free choice of the defendant. 
56 R. K. Helm and V. F. Reyna, above n. 38. In this article, the authors apply a psychological 
theory of memory and decision-making (Fuzzy-Trace Theory) to plea deals to suggest that 
neuro-typical adults are likely to be driven by categorical distinctions in plea offers where these 
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considerations of guilt or innocence (primarily a meaning-based categorical distinction) and 
relatively short sentence reductions (primarily more superficial and fine-grained distinctions) 
decision making is likely to be driven more by guilt or innocence. This means that innocent 
defendants are more likely to go to trial, and guilty defendants are more likely to plead guilty, as 
is desirable. However, where the decision to plead guilty includes consideration of another 
categorical meaning-based variable (such as the distinction between a custodial and non-
custodial sentence) this is likely to interfere with consideration of factual guilt or innocence. 
Defendants are left not just deciding whether they want to admit guilt in exchange for a small 
reduction in sentence, but are left having to decide whether it is worth them risking a custodial 
sentence when they can be fairly sure they will not get a custodial sentence if they plead guilty.  
 
In addition, decision-making research shows that options are often viewed comparatively and 
can be influenced by heuristics (mental shortcuts) known as ‘contrast effects.’ Contrast effects 
occur when exposure to a previous piece of information influences a subsequent evaluation 
through providing a contrast to it. For example, in one experiment it was shown that judicial 
assessments of the credibility of a psychiatrist were influenced by having previously seen 
information about a more poorly qualified psychiatrist.57  Specifically, judges who read about a 
poorly qualified psychiatrist first found a well-qualified psychiatrist to be more credible than 
those who had not also evaluated the poorly qualified psychiatrist. In this example, although 
previous exposure to the poorly qualified psychiatrist did not influence the credentials of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
are present. This is due to a developmentally advanced cognitive processing style known as ‘gist’ 
processing. For more information see V. Reyna, ‘A new intuitionism: Meaning, memory, and 
development in Fuzzy-Trace Theory,’ 7(3) Judgment and Decision Making, 332.  
57 J. J. Rachlinski, A. J. Wistrich, and C. Guthrie, ‘Altering attention in adjudication,’ (2013) 
60(6) UCLA Law Rev.  1586. 
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well-qualified psychiatrist, it did make the well-qualified psychiatrist look better by providing a 
contrast. In the context of decisions to plead guilty, knowledge of a possible custodial sentence if 
convicted at trial may make a definite non-custodial sentence as a result of a guilty plea look less 
bad even for an innocent defendant. In this situation, innocent defendants will be cognitively 
disposed to display the downsides of receiving a conviction provided that the sentence for that 
conviction is non-custodial in nature (since this is, at least, much better than a conviction with a 
custodial sentence). This may lead innocent defendants to be willing to accept a conviction and 
non-custodial sentence for a crime that they did not commit. In these situations, defendants in a 
vulnerable position in the criminal justice system are not being protected from being offered 
deals that can essentially be coercive. 
 
3. Getting out of the criminal justice system more quickly and easily 
Finally, although custody is perhaps the most important incentive, getting out of the criminal 
justice system more quickly and easily in general may also be a powerful incentive for some 
defendants in England and Wales. Going to trial involves significant expenditure that not all 
defendants are able to incur. First, limitations to the legal aid system mean that some defendants 
may not be able to afford the cost of going to trial, including the cost of legal representation.58 
Only those with an adjusted income of £12,475 or less are likely to have their legal 
                                                     
58 The rules about who qualifies for legal aid are set out in the Legal Aid Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and accompanying regulations (primarily the Criminal Legal 
Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 2013). To qualify for legal aid, a defendant must meet the 
interests of justice test (a merits-based test) and be financially eligible (a means-based test). In 
the magistrate’s courts, anyone with an adjusted household income of £22,325 or more is not 
eligible for any legal aid. In the Crown Court, anyone with a household disposable income of 
£37,500 or more is not eligible for legal aid.  
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representation fully funded.59 This means that many defendants have to pay at least a significant 
contribution towards their legal costs. If defendants have to pay privately, they may not be able 
to afford the fee for trial representation, and so are left with no choice but to plead guilty or to 
represent themselves and thus enter into a trial process they are unlikely to fully understand. In 
addition, even defendants representing themselves are likely to incur costs in certain types of 
case, for example in cases in which expert evidence must be obtained this will need to be paid 
for. Essentially, the decision regarding whether to plead guilty stops being a decision about a 
certain reduced punishment or the possibility of a more severe punishment, and starts to be a 
decision about a certain reduced punishment or the possibility of a more severe punishment plus 
the significant expenditure necessary as part of a trial process.  
 
In addition, going to trial involves significantly more time than deciding to plead guilty. Pleading 
guilty may end up being a better option due to the relative speed and ease with which a matter 
can be closed. In 2016, the average hearing time was 13.8 hours when a defendant plead not 
guilty compared to 1.6 hours when a defendant plead guilty.60 This is in addition to the 
preliminary hearings that are typically involved in a case, and periods of adjournment. Recent 
initiatives have made entering guilty pleas even easier, specifically for traffic offences, by 
putting them online.61 Thus, while pleading not guilty and going to trial will cause a defendant to 
have to take time off work, and likely cause them to incur significant expenses (for example, the 
cost of representation, the cost of travel, the cost of child care), pleading guilty can be as easy as 
                                                     
59 s. 31 of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and s.18 of the 
Criminal Legal Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 2013.  
60Ministry of Justice, above n. 53. 
61 See BBC News ‘Online motoring offences plea service launched’ (2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31653760>. 
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going online and clicking through a guilty plea system. This provides a powerful incentive to 
plead guilty among defendants who are under financial strain or who have insecure employment 
who may view a guilty plea as their only realistic option, even independently of the risk of 
custody. This may well result in defendants who are financially insecure pleading guilty when 
innocent and getting swept in to the criminal justice system, while defendants who are 
financially secure and can afford to go to trial will go to trial and be found not guilty. 
 
ENSURING CONSENT IN PLEA DECISIONS 
 
Understanding the unique vulnerabilities of defendants in the criminal justice system and 
incentives present in the system that may lead them with no practical choice but to plead guilty, 
can, it is suggested here, help us to design reforms to ensure guilty pleas are entered freely and 
truly consensually. Importantly such reforms do not need to involve eliminating guilty pleas, or 
sentence length reductions, and so can retain many of the utilitarian benefits of the current 
system.62 
 
So, what can be done in this regard? First, although a one-third reduction in sentence may appear 
reasonable and relatively modest, the decision to plead guilty should not make the difference 
between a custodial sentence and a community sentence. According to the Sentencing Council 
‘Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences Definitive Guideline,’ ‘a custodial sentence 
must not be imposed unless the offence or the combination of the offence and one or more 
                                                     
62 For a summary of some of the benefits to the system of allowing guilty pleas, see Sentencing 
Council, ‘Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea Definitive Guideline’ (2017), 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction-in-Sentence-for-Guilty-
plea-Definitive-Guide_FINAL_WEB.pdf> 
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offences associated with it was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can 
be justified for the offence.’63 If a community sentence can be justified for an offence, this 
community sentence should be the penalty given regardless of whether conviction for the offence 
occurs via guilty plea or via trial. If a community sentence cannot be justified for an offence, 
custody should be the sentence regardless of whether the conviction for the offence occurs via 
guilty plea or trial. When deciding whether to impose a custodial sentence, the key consideration 
should be the nature of the offence not the means through which conviction for the offence has 
occurred. By ensuring that the sentence type given is consistent regardless of the means through 
which conviction occurs, the system can protect innocent defendants from feeling they have no 
practical choice but to plead guilty to avoid even a small risk of a custodial sentence.  
  
Second, and perhaps more ambitiously, the discrepancy in time and expense between trial and 
plea needs to be reduced. The current system is likely putting some defendants in an impossible 
position where they are faced with a financially and logistically impossible task of mounting a 
trial defence, or an easy way out which only requires them to accept guilt. Initiatives aimed at 
making it easier to plead guilty only increase this discrepancy between plea and trial and only 
make mounting a defence at trial seem a more impossible task. Making contesting guilt 
significantly more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming than pleading guilty disadvantages 
innocent defendants who are left wanting to contest their guilt at trial but knowing that in reality 
this may not be a good or even realistic option for them given external pressures. Relatedly, the 
system must ensure that defendants are not remanded in custody where they are likely to be able 
                                                     
63 Sentencing Council, ‘Definitive Guideline on the Imposition of Community and Custodial 
Sentences’ (2016), <https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Definitive-
Guideline-Imposition-of-CCS-final-web.pdf> 
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to receive a non-custodial sentence if they plead guilty. Although the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 means that a defendant should not be remanded in custody 
where there is no real prospect of being sentenced to a custodial sentence in legal proceedings, 
this is subject to a number of exceptions, and does not necessarily prevent defendants being 
remanded in custody where they would receive a non-custodial sentence by pleading guilty (as 
opposed to at trial). 64  Defendants should not be faced with having to remain in poor conditions 
away from family and employment in remand prisons if they want to contest guilt where they 
can be released if they no longer want to contest guilt. This circumstance, when it arises, is 
highly likely to coerce innocent defendants into pleading guilty to get out of jail. Making 
conditional bail options such as electronic monitoring or tagging more widely available may help 
here, since such options can ensure attendance at trial while also recognizing that a particular 
defendant may not need to be kept in custody for other reasons (for example, dangerousness).65  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Defendants in the criminal justice system are in an inherently vulnerable position, typically with 
limited resources and with liberty, freedom, and reputation at stake. The need for the criminal 
justice system to provide protections to defendants (who may be innocent) in this context is 
overwhelming. However, the current criminal justice system offers insufficient safeguards to 
protect defendants deciding whether to plead guilty or go to trial, and psycho-legal research, 
                                                     
64 Bail Act 1976 Sch. 1, as amended by Legal Aid, Sentencing, and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 Sch. 11.  
65 For a discussion of electronically monitored punishment and its current implementation in 
different jurisdictions including England and Wales, see M. Nellis, K. Beyens, and D. Kaminski, 
Electronically monitored punishment: International and critical perspectives (2013).  
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research on the psychology of decision-making, and empirical evidence from the United States 
system, suggest such deals may operate coercively. This results in a system in which defendants 
may be placed in situations in which they feel that they really have no choice but to plead guilty 
to a criminal offence. Particularly for defendants who are single parents, who have low income, 
insecure employment and housing, or self-run businesses, pleading guilty can be the only sure 
way to avoid outcomes that they are not able to cope with – such as custody, significant financial 
expense, or impossible time commitment. Perhaps most worryingly, the defendants who are most 
likely to be left with no practical choice but to plead guilty in these situations are those from low 
socio-economic status backgrounds. This means that while those with access to greater resources 
may be able to accept these risks and mount an effective defence at trial, those with fewer 
resources will be disproportionately and wrongly swept up into the criminal justice system 
through pleas. The system must do more to protect these defendants, and must reduce what could 
be coercive discrepancies between plea and trial as part of a broader effort to protect vulnerable 
defendants.  
 
Ultimately, at least in the case of defendants choosing to plead guilty, the criminal justice system 
is neglecting the fact that these defendants are in an inherently vulnerable position and need 
access to institutional support to truly exercise their own freedom. We need to move away from 
the view of defendants as agents who automatically have free choice when deciding whether to 
plead guilty, and towards a system which asks how can we facilitate consensual, voluntary, 
choices for defendants accused of a criminal offence? This article provides the starting point for 
such a discussion, raising issues regarding the integrity of the criminal justice system in England 
and Wales that it is critical to address.  
